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INTRODUCTION 
ZANTAC®1 and XANAX®2 are not cities in China or 
galaxies explored by Captain Kirk. Nor do LAMISIL®3and 
LAMICTAL®4 refer to sick farm animals. In fact, these peculiar 
terms, which share both a similar handwritten appearance and 
similar sound, are actually the unique brand names of four 
popular prescription drugs. As with any brand name or 
trademark, using these drug names in a manner likely to 
confuse consumers jeopardizes the goodwill of the trademark 
owner and threatens fair competition. For this reason, like any 
other good or service, drug trademarks must remain subject to 
regulation to ensure fair, robust competition. 
There is a much more compelling reason to minimize 
confusion among prescription drug names, however. That 
reason is protecting lives. According to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), such confusion among look-alike and 
sound-alike drugs accounts for approximately ten percent of all 
reported medication errors5 and injures approximately 1.3 
million people every year.6  One example involved an eight-
year-old boy who was to be treated for Attention Deficit 
Disorder with the drug methylphenidate but died after being 
prescribed and ingesting methadone, the opiate-based drug 
used to treat heroin withdrawal.7 In addition, a fifty-year-old 
 1. ZANTAC Home Page, http://zantac.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) 
(stating that ZANTAC helps fight Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease). 
 2. XANAX Home Page, http://www.anxietyinfo.com (last visited Jan. 20, 
2007) (stating that XANAX helps fight anxiety disorders). 
 3. LAMISIL Home Page, http://www.lamisil.com (last visited Jan. 20, 
2007) (stating that LAMISIL helps fight nail fungus). 
 4. LAMICTAL Home Page, http://www.lamictal.com (last visited Jan. 20, 
2007) (stating that LAMICTAL is a maintenance medication for bipolar 
disorder). 
 5. Carol Rados, Drug Name Confusion: Preventing Medication Errors, 
FDA CONSUMER MAG., July-Aug. 2005, at 35. 
 6. Medication Errors, FDA CDER HANDBOOK, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/mederror.htm. 
 7. Rados, supra note 5, at 35. 
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woman was hospitalized after allegedly ingesting the prostate 
drug FLOMAX® rather than the drug with a similar sounding 
name, VOLMAX®, which is used to treat bronchospasms.8 
The health risks associated with confusingly similar drug 
names have raised the eyebrows of the FDA.9  In response, the 
FDA’s Associate Director for Medication Error, Jerry Phillips, 
announced that the FDA’s Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk 
Assessment (now the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) 
would begin conducting independent reviews and testing of 
drug trademarks.10 Although preventing medication errors and 
protecting patient safety is of utmost importance, the FDA’s 
assumed authority to evaluate pharmaceutical trademarks has 
placed the FDA and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) (the federal agency entrusted with regulating 
trademarks) in a peculiar jurisdictional overlap. 
This article argues that the current system under which the 
FDA and the PTO evaluate proposed drug trademarks, 
although necessary, lacks efficiency and specificity and also 
fails to provide drug manufacturers with clear and predictable 
guidelines for obtaining drug trademark approval. Although 
maintaining public safety must remain the primary concern 
regardless of how the FDA and the PTO review drug names, 
this end can be achieved more appropriately and more 
efficiently by requiring both agencies to develop and implement 
clear, integrated, and workable guidelines for reviewing 
proposed pharmaceutical trademarks. 
Part I of this paper will provide a general overview of 
trademark law, the Food and Drug Administration, and the 
processes by which both the FDA and the PTO evaluate 
proposed drug names. Part II will briefly examine alternatives 
to joint agency review and will discuss why the FDA and the 
PTO are indispensable to the drug name approval process, 
particularly in light of the growing trend of direct-to-consumer 
(DTC) advertising.  Part III will highlight the complications and 
inefficiencies associated with the current system of joint review 
and will propose: (1) a modification of the PTO’s intent-to-use 
provisions for purposes of pharmaceutical drug trademarks, and 
(2) a requirement for the FDA to complete its proposed drug 
 8. Id. 
 9. Cf. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000) 
(stating that a drug shall be deemed misbranded if it is false or misleading). 
 10. See Marc J. Scheineson, FDA Limits on Dual Trademarks Tread on 
Patient Safety and Law, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 25, 2003, at 1. 
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name review during a specific and predictable timeframe.  Part 
IV will explore specific FDA shortcomings and will argue for a 
codified, statistically reliable procedure for evaluating proposed 
drug names. 
PART I - OVERVIEW 
A. TRADEMARK LAW 
1. The Functions of Trademark Law and the Likelihood of 
Confusion Analysis 
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof...used by a person... to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source 
of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”11 The protections 
of trademark law enable the supermarket customer to choose to 
purchase COCA-COLA® to the exclusion of other colas, knowing 
that the famous red label showcasing white letters refers to a 
particular and familiar brand of cola.  Trademarks carry 
economic utility in that purchasers confronted with an array of 
similar products made by different producers are able to reject 
potentially or actually non-satisfactory products in favor of 
those that were satisfactory in the past.12 Succinctly described, 
“[t]rademarks fix responsibility. Without [trade]marks, a 
seller’s mistakes or low quality products would be untraceable 
to their source.”13 
Broadly speaking, trademark law is an arm of the law of 
unfair competition.14 The overarching purpose of trademark law 
is to foster a competitive fair market, free from the burdens of 
unfair competition, while providing consumer protection.15 In 
achieving this end, trademarks have, throughout history, served 
to indicate the producer or source of the particular goods or 
services offered.16 
 11. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 12. J.THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed., vol. 1 2006). 
 13. Id. at § 2:4. 
 14. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003). 
 15. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 2:2. 
 16. See generally Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks — Their Early History, 
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To safeguard the economic value of a trademark, trademark 
law aims to protect owners from the parasitic attempts of 
competitors who might attempt to capture the trademark 
owner’s goodwill.17  Goodwill is “a business value that reflects 
the basic human propensity to continue doing business with a 
seller who has offered goods and services that the customer 
likes and has found adequate to fulfill his needs.”18  As Justice 
Frankfurter explained, trademark law “promotes honesty and 
comports with experience to assume that the wrongdoer who 
makes profits from the sales of goods bearing a mark belonging 
to another was enabled to do so because he was drawing upon 
the good will generated by that mark.”19 The forbidden practice 
of “poaching” another’s goodwill, known as “infringement,”20 
has the potential to deceive consumers, rob profits, and destroy 
the trademark owner’s goodwill.21  Federal law known as the 
“Lanham Trademark Act” (Lanham Act),22 among its many 
provisions, provides several remedies for trademark owners 
aggrieved by the effects of infringement.23 
2. The PTO’s Role in Evaluating Trademarks 
Like any other good or service, pharmaceutical trademarks 
59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551–72 (1969) (giving an in-depth analysis of 
trademark history). 
 17. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 
203, 207 (1942). 
 18. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 2:17. 
 19. Id. (stating that purchasers may be induced to buy because they 
believe they are buying another’s product). 
    20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).  Infringement occurs when any person 
shall,  
without the consent of the registrant, use in commerce any 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered 
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which 
such use is likely to cause confusion or cause mistake or to deceive.  
Id. 
     21.   See Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 206–07. 
 22. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (2000). 
 23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116 (2000). The primary remedy for trademark 
infringement is injunctive relief. Id. However, where a trademark owner is a 
victim of willful infringement, the mark owner may be entitled to “(1) the 
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs 
of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). In exceptional cases, treble damages 
and reasonable attorney’s fees are available.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2000). 
Finally, a court may also order that the infringer destroy all infringing articles. 
15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2000). 
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are eligible for trademark registration with the PTO.24 
Applications for pharmaceutical trademarks are reviewed in 
much the same way as applications for other trademarks.25 
The initial step in protecting a trademark is using it in 
commerce.26 The next step in protecting a trademark, 
particularly a mark used nationwide in interstate commerce, is 
obtaining federal registration through the PTO.27  Although 
registration of a trademark is not necessary to acquire 
trademark rights,28 registration provides greater economic 
protection to the trademark owner29 and is the key to use of the 
trademark to the exclusion of others.30 
As an early alternative to using the trademark in 
commerce, an applicant for federal registration may take 
advantage of the Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions.31  
Applicants who file intent-to-use applications with the PTO 
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1401.02(b) (2d ed. 
1997) (listing pharmaceuticals as a class 5 good). 
 25. See Mary Anthony Merchant, Getting and Keeping RX Trademarks, 
TECHNOLOGY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE LAW, Spring 2004, at 6, 8 
(describing the PTO process for reviewing pharmaceutical trademarks). But 
see, Suzanne Skolnick, Overlap in Mark Registration Authority Between the 
PTO and the FDA, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 100, 100 (2001) (because of 
the significant public health risks of medication errors due to confusing drug 
names, the PTO has adopted a “doctrine of greater care” in resolving opposition 
proceedings) (citing Martha M. Rumore, the Role of Pharmacists in the 
Pharmaceutical Trademark Evaluation Process, 6 J. PHARMACY & L. 83, 85 
(1997)). As compared to a non-pharmaceutical trademark application, this 
elevated standard requires the applicant to overcome a more stringent 
quantum of proof that the proposed trademark is not likely to cause confusion. 
Skolnick, supra, at 100–01. What that quantum of proof is, however, is unclear, 
because the doctrine of greater care has not been enacted into law. 
 26. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 19:1-5. 
 27. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:3. 
 28. One may obtain common law rights to a trademark simply by using the 
trademark in commerce. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:3. 
 29. First, the registrant is armed with a presumption that the trademark 
is valid and “incontestable” once the mark has been registered for a period of 
five years. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000). Second, registration provides competitors 
with constructive notice of trademark use. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2000). Third, the 
registrant has automatic access to the federal courts by virtue of registration 
and without the need of an independent basis for federal jurisdiction such as 
diversity of citizenship, subject matter jurisdiction, or supplemental 
jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1070–71 (2000). 
 30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–52, 1057 (2000) for the specific requirements 
and methods of trademark registration. 
 31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b)–(d) (2000). 
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need not immediately use the trademark in commerce as a 
prerequisite to registration.32 Rather, the applicant’s trademark 
will be published on the principal register, and he or she may 
delay use for up to six months after the PTO issues a “notice of 
allowance.”33  If the applicant is unable to use the trademark 
within six months after the notice of allowance issues, the 
applicant may obtain extensions in six-month increments, with 
total extension time not to exceed thirty months.34 On average, 
obtaining trademark registration through the PTO’s intent-to-
use provisions takes approximately twenty months.35 
Whether filing a use-based application or an intent-to-use 
application, obtaining federal registration under the Lanham 
Act requires that the proposed trademark be sufficiently 
distinct from existing trademarks such that use of the proposed 
trademark will not cause confusion.36  In determining whether 
a proposed trademark is likely to cause confusion among the 
purchasing public, a PTO trademark examiner considers 
several factors (referred to as DuPont factors).37 Among them 
are the following: 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their 
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and 
commercial impression. 
(2) The relatedness of the goods or services as 
described in an application or registration or in 
connection with which a prior mark is in use. 
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, 
likely-to-continue trade channels. 
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom 
 32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (2000). 
 33. Id. 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2) (2000) (the thirty month extension period is in 
addition to the original six month period). 
 35. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:125 (reporting that in 2004, the 
average time to obtain registration under the PTO’s intent-to-use provision 
was 19.5 months). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Specifically, registration of a trademark will be 
refused if the mark 
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark 
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade 
name previously used in the United States by another and not 
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the 
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive . . . .. Id. (emphasis added). 
 37. See In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 
1973). 
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sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, 
sophisticated purchasing. 
(5) The number and nature of similar marks in use on 
similar goods. 
(6) A valid consent agreement between the applicant 
and the owner of the previously registered mark.38 
3. Confusion Analysis in the Courts 
Like PTO trademark examiners evaluating a proposed 
trademark, courts presiding over suits alleging trademark 
infringement analyze whether the alleged infringing party is 
using the plaintiff’s trademark in a manner that is likely to 
confuse.39 In evaluating the likelihood of confusion between 
goods or services, courts generally consider some variant of the 
eight “Polaroid factors.”40  A judicial emphasis on consumer 
confusion, which stems from adoption of the Polaroid factors, 
appears in every federal appellate circuit.41 Among its other 
forms, “confusion,” in the trademark sense, may refer to product 
 38. TMEP, supra note 24, at § 1207.01; see also In re E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours, 476 F.2d at 1361. 
 39. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 23:1. 
 40. Polaroid Co. v. Polarad Electronics Co., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). These factors include (1) the strength of the 
plaintiff’s trademark; (2) the degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s trademarks; (3) the proximity of the products or services; (4) the 
likelihood that the plaintiff will “bridge the gap;” (5) evidence of actual 
confusion; (6) whether the defendant acted in good faith in adopting the 
trademark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product or service; and (8) the 
level of sophistication with which buyers purchase the product or service. Id. at 
495. 
 41. See, e.g., Star Industries, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 383 
(2d Cir. 2005) (“numerous, ordinary, prudent purchasers”) (citations omitted); 
Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676-77 (9th Cir. 2005); 
KOS Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 713 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“ordinary consumers”); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 
477, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2004) (the “digits of confusion” test requires analysis of 
the likelihood of consumer confusion); International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe 
des Bains de Mer et du Cercle Des Estrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 382 
(4th Cir. 2003); Gray v. Meijer, Inc., 295 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(“prospective purchasers”); Davidoff & CIE, S.A., v. PLD Intern. Corp., 263 
F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 
F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2000); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 
27, 43 (1st Cir. 1998); Big O Tires, Inc. v. Bigfoot 4x4, Inc., 167 F.Supp.2d 1216, 
1222 (D. Colo. 2001) (“likely to cause confusion in the market place”) (citation 
omitted). 
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confusion or source confusion.42 An example of source confusion, 
the most common form of trademark confusion, is the confusion 
caused by the names SLICKCRAFT and SLEEKCRAFT in 
reference to two different brands of boats.43 In cases of source 
confusion, the confused consumer mistakenly believes the 
senior user, that is, the user entitled to priority use of the 
trademark, is the manufacturer of the infringing product.44 On 
the other hand, product confusion does not involve confusion 
regarding the source or origin of the goods, but may arise 
merely by the “identity of the product itself.”45  One example of 
product confusion is the confusion between the cholesterol drug 
ADVICOR® and the drug formerly marketed as ALTOCOR.46 
B. FDA 
1. Agency Overview 
The FDA is responsible for regulating select “food products, 
. . . human and animal drugs, therapeutic agents of biological 
origin, medical devices, [and] radiation emitting products for 
consumer, medical and occupational use, cosmetics, and animal 
feed.”47 Initially named the “United States Bureau of 
Chemistry,” the agency did not obtain its present name until 
1930.48 Nevertheless, while empowering the Bureau of 
Chemistry, Congress paved the path for modern day drug laws 
with the passage of the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 
(1906 Act).49  The 1906 Act, ultimately inspired by journalistic 
exposure of the abhorrent, “nauseating” conditions of the 
 42. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 23:5. 
 43. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 44. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 23:5. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. Because ALTOCOR was held to be confusingly similar to 
ADVICOR, ALTOCOR is no longer a trademark.   See KOS Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1874 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 47. John P. Swann, History of the FDA, U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/fulltext.html (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2006). One hundred and five patients died, many of whom 
were children, as a result of the drug, a chemical analogue of antifreeze, being 
placed on the market without testing.  Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the 
Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 122 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 456 (March 15, 1995), available at 
http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/122/6/456. 
 48. Swann, supra note 47. 
 49. Id.  See Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. 
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meatpacking industry, affected not only butchers, cattlemen, 
and plant workers, but also individuals involved in the 
manufacture and/or marketing of drugs.50  While regulation of 
the food industry was a priority under the 1906 Act, the Act also 
empowered the Bureau of Chemistry to seize any food or drug 
featuring labels that were either false or misleading.51 
Although the 1906 Act was a step in the right direction, the 
Bureau of Chemistry did little under the Act to prevent 
deceptive advertising for drugs, medical devices, and 
cosmetics.52 For example, the FDA was unable to stop 
commercial sales of drugs such as Banbar, which failed to cure 
diabetes as promised, and Lash-Lure mascara, which caused 
blindness.53 Despite the deceptiveness with which Banbar and 
Lash-Lure were marketed, overwhelming support for the 
passage of more stringent drug regulations did not arise until 
1937 when over one hundred people died from Tennessee Drug 
Company’s newly marketed pediatric “wonder drug” elixir 
sulfanilamide.54 As a result, President Roosevelt signed the 
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) into law.55 With 
its primary aim of consumer safety, the FDCA (1) required drug 
labels to incorporate directions for safe use prior to being made 
available on the market, (2) prohibited the marketing of drugs 
with false therapeutic claims, and (3) required FDA laboratory 
analysis of all new drugs to ensure their safety for the 
marketplace.56 Today, although the FDA is charged with 
protecting the public health, the agency has evolved from its 
days of monitoring meatpacking plants and mascara. Currently, 
the FDA employs over 9,000 individuals57 and operates with an 
annual budget of approximately 1.4 billion dollars.58 
 50. Swann, supra note 47. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. FDA OFFICE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND DIVERSITY 
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN FY 2004 AND BEYOND…, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/eeo/strategicplan04.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
 58. FDA Office of Financial Management, Budget Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/budgetfaqs.htm (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2006). 
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2.  The FDA Drug Approval Process 
“It takes twelve years on average for an experimental drug 
to travel from lab to medicine chest.”59 Before the FDA gets 
involved, the drug applicant has typically completed 
approximately three and one half years of pre-clinical testing.60 
The pre-clinical phase analyzes laboratory and animal studies 
for the purpose of making a preliminary safety determination.61 
FDA involvement begins when the drug applicant files an 
Investigational New Drug Application with the FDA.62 Shortly 
thereafter, the drug is tested on humans during three phases of 
clinical trials.63 Only 1 in 1000 drugs studied in pre-clinical 
testing continues on to clinical trials.64 
During the Phase I clinical trial, which typically lasts one 
year, the drug applicant administers the drug to approximately 
twenty to eighty healthy volunteers to determine the drug’s 
safety and dosage, and to analyze how the drug is 
metabolized.65  During Phase II, the drug applicant administers 
the drug to up to 300 patient volunteers with a disease or 
sickness to evaluate the drug’s efficacy and potential side effects 
over the course of approximately two years.66  During Phase III, 
which typically lasts three years, the volunteer sample size 
increases approximately ten-fold to verify the drug’s efficacy 
and to monitor any adverse reactions from long term-use.67 
Only after completing all three stages of clinical trials does 
the drug applicant file a New Drug Application (NDA) with the 
FDA.68 During this phase, the FDA reviews all phases of 
clinical trials and makes a decision whether to approve or reject 
the drug, a process requiring approximately two and a half 
years.69 In the end, only about one of every five drugs that enter 
 59. DALE E. WIERENGA & C. ROBERT EATON, PHARMACEUTICAL 
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, PHASES OF PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, 
http://www.allp.com/drug_dev.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Michelle Meadows, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs 
are Safe and Effective, 36 FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE 4, (July-August 2002), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2002/402_drug.html. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Meadows, supra note 62. 
 69 See, e.g., id.; WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59. 
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clinical trials is approved by the FDA for commercial
 
 
TABLE 1: STAGES OF DRUG TESTING AND APPROVAL71 
 
Preclinical 
Testing 
File 
IND 
at 
FDA 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
File 
NDA 
at 
FDA
FDA 
Review 
Phase IV 
Average 
Years/ 
Stage 
3.5 1 2 3 2.5 
Additional 
Post 
marketing 
testing 
required 
by FDA 
Test 
Population 
Laboratory 
and animal 
studies 
20 to 80 
healthy 
volunteers
100 to 300 
patient 
volunteers 
1000 to 3000 
patient 
volunteers 
Review 
process / 
Approval
Purpose 
Assess 
safety and 
biological 
activity 
Determine 
safety and 
dosage 
Evaluate 
effectiveness, 
look for side 
effects 
Verify 
effectiveness, 
monitor 
adverse 
reactions 
from long-
term use 
New Drug 
Candidates 
5,000 
compounds 
evaluated 
5 enter trials 
1 
approved
 
A.  THE FDA AND DRUG NAMES 
1.  Components of a Drug Name 
An FDA-approved drug has not one, but three official 
names. Each drug has a chemical name, a generic (non-
proprietary) name, and a brand (proprietary) name.72  Except 
for chemists, few people are likely to recognize even the names
of famous drugs such as N-(4-hydroxyphenyl) acetamide.  On
does not have to be a chemist, however, to recognize the generic 
name “acetaminophen.”  In fact, these are the chemical and 
 
e 
                                                          
 70 WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Rados, supra note 5, at 36. 
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generic names of the drug known and marketed as 
“TYLENOL®.”73 
a.  Chemical Names 
A drug’s chemical name indicates its chemical makeup and 
is generally not used in practice among physicians and 
pharmacists.74 When the FDA approves a drug, the United 
States Adopted Names Council (USAN Council) creates its 
generic or “official” name.75 The Council is a private 
organization composed of three sponsoring organizations: the 
American Medical Association, United States Pharmacopeia, 
and the American Pharmaceutical Association.76  The FDA is 
also represented on the USAN Council77 and has reserved the 
authority to designate a drug name if “necessary or desirable in 
the interest of usefulness and simplicity.”78  The decisions of the 
USAN Council do not bind the FDA.  The FDA, however, defers 
to the Council in “recogniz[ing] the skill and experience of [the 
USAN Council] in deriving names for drugs.”79  After both the 
USAN Council and the World Health Organization approve a 
generic name, the USAN Council then publishes the name in 
the “Trademark Bulletin of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America,” and in the “Pharmacopeial 
Forum.”80 
b. Generic Names 
A drug’s generic name is designed to direct physicians 
and pharmacists to a particular drug class and is typically 
composed of a medically significant stem and a chemically 
significant root.81 For example, the prefix “dopa” refers to the 
class of drugs known as “dopa receptor agonists,” and the suffix 
 73. THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION – SECOND HOME 
EDITION 88-89 (Mark H. Beers ed., Pocket Books 2003), available at 
http://www.merck.com/mmhe/sec02/ch017/ch017a.html. 
 74. Rados, supra note 5, at 37. 
 75. The Merck Manual, supra note 73, at 88-89. 
 76. 21 C.F.R. § 299.4(c) (2006).  See also Linda Gundersen, The Complex 
Process of Naming Drugs, 129 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 677, 677-78 (1998), 
available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/129/8/677. 
 77. 21 C.F.R. § 299.4(d) (2006). 
 78. 21 U.S.C. § 358(a) (2001). 
 79. See 21 C.F.R. § 299.4(c). 
 80. Gundersen, supra note 76. 
 81. Rados, supra note 5, at 37. 
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“mab” refers to “monoclonal antibodies.”82  Generic names are 
continuously in the public domain.83  Therefore, unlike a 
proprietary name, the manufacturer does not have an exclusive 
right to the generic name.84 Drugs with generic prefixes and 
suffixes may look and sound confusingly similar to drugs with a 
similar name, but a substantially different use.85  This can 
result in patients being prescribed the wrong drugs.86 
c. Proprietary Names 
Finally, a new drug will receive a proprietary name. The 
FDA defines the term “proprietary name” as “the name the 
applicant or other entity will use for the commercial 
distribution of the product,” which is a drug’s trademark or 
brand name.87 The proprietary name is intended to solicit brand 
recognition and generate sales.  This name is the central focus 
of a drug company’s overall advertising campaign for the 
drug.88 The drug manufacturer may acquire trademark rights 
in the brand name through use and, almost invariably, federal 
registration.89 Unlike a drug’s generic name, which is intended 
to describe its function or structure,90 a proprietary name is 
typically coined by consulting firms with expertise in 
prescription drug “naming.”91 As one author succinctly 
summarized, “creating a generic name is a science; creating a 
 82. Id. 
 83. Gunderson, supra note 76. 
 84. Id. 
 85. One such example is confusion about the common prefix “meth,” which 
has caused confusion between the substantially different drugs methadone and 
methylphenidate. See Rados, supra note 5, at 35 and accompanying text. 
 86. See id.  Although prescription errors due to confusingly similar generic 
names is an important topic, the issues presented by such generic name 
confusion and how they should be resolved are beyond the scope of this article. 
 87. See Regulatory SOPP 8001.4 Review of CBER Regulated Product 
Proprietary Names (August 15, 2002),  
http://www.fda.gov/cber/regsopp/80014.htm. 
 88. See Merchant, supra note 25, at 8-9. 
 89. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 19:1-5. 
 90. See The Merck Manual, supra note 73. 
 91. Rados, supra note 5, at 35.  Brand Institute Inc. and Medical Error 
Recognition are examples of these firms.  See Brand Institute Inc., 
http://www.brandinstitute.com/consumer_index.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2006); 
Med-E.R.R.S.®, http://www.med-errs.com/services.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 
2006). 
HERBERHOLZ D. Curing Confusion: An Overview of the Regulatory Complexities of Obtaining 
Pharmaceutical Trademarks and a Prescription for Reform. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2006;8(1):97-126.  
2007] CURING CONFUSION 111 
                                                          
brand name is more of an art.”92 
2.  FDA Review of Proprietary Names 
FDA authority for reviewing proprietary names is rooted in 
the agency’s authority to regulate misleading drug labeling.93  A 
drug name may mislead if its proprietary name, “because of 
similarity in spelling or pronunciation, may be confused with 
the proprietary name or the [generic] name of a different drug 
or ingredient.”94 The FDA requires a drug applicant to submit 
two proposed names in order of preference for review,95 and the 
FDA must review all proposed pharmaceutical and over-the-
counter drug trademarks prior to their use in commerce.96 In 
rather bureaucratic fashion, the FDA’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research (Center) assigns the majority of such 
trademark reviews to the Office of Drug Safety’s (ODS) 
“Division of Medication Errors and Technical Support” (Division 
of Medication Errors).97 The Division of Medication Error’s 
fundamental purpose is to minimize medication errors that may 
arise from drug trademarks that look or sound like the 
trademarks of other drugs.98 Typically, the FDA reviews the 
proposed drug name as early as the end of Phase II clinical 
trials and again within ninety days of the drug’s expected date 
of approval.99 Thus, on average, over five years lapse between 
the FDA’s first review of the proposed name and the FDA’s final 
review on the eve of the drug’s market approval.100 
Although both the FDA and the PTO seek to preclude 
confusion, their reviews serve independent and “fundamentally 
different purposes.”101  The PTO does not guard public safety, 
but rather attempts to ensure that “consumers are able to 
distinguish and identify the source of the drug product bearing 
 92. Gundersen, supra note 76. 
 93. Stephen C. Clifford, The Name Game: Creating a Trademark for a New 
Drug Product, DRUG DELIVERY TECH., Sept. 2002, available at 
http://www.drugdeliverytech.com/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?idArticle=67.  See also 21 
U.S.C. § 352(a); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.10-201.323. 
 94. 21 C.F.R. § 201.10(c)(5). 
 95. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:149. 
 96. See Gundersen, supra note 76. 
 97. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:149. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Clifford, supra note 93. 
 100. See WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59. 
 101. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:150. 
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the trademark.”102  The FDA’s review seeks to guard against 
confusing and misleading drug names and labels that might 
result in errors in prescription, dispensing, and consumption.103  
The FDA’s interest in proposed drug trade names extends, in 
part, to barring drug names that are inherently misleading, 
that make false promises, or suggest their function and purpose 
(efficacy).104  Such authority stems from the FDA’s mandate to 
regulate false or misleading drug labels.105 For example, 
Upjohn, the manufacturer of the drug known today as 
ROGAINE®, originally attempted to use the name REGAIN for 
its hair growth drug.106  The FDA denied such use, reasoning 
that use of the name REGAIN would send a message to 
consumers of guaranteeing, or at least suggesting, hair 
growth.107 
In addition to regulating misleading drug names, the FDA 
is also concerned with eliminating “look-alike sound-alike” 
confusion among phonetically or visually similar drug names.108  
In evaluating whether a proposed drug name looks or sounds 
like another drug, the FDA’s Division of Medication Errors first 
employs an expert panel to exchange opinions regarding any 
risks associated with potential look-alike or sound-alike drug 
trademarks.109 The panel is comprised of “medication error 
prevention staff and representatives from the Division of Drug 
Marketing and Advertising Communications.”110  These experts 
discuss whether a proposed proprietary name might be confused 
with an existing name.111 If there is a possibility of confusion, 
 102. Clifford, supra note 93. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Susan Ipaktchian, The Name Game, STAN. MED. MAG., Summer 2005, 
available at http://mednews.stanford.edu/stanmed/2005summer/name-
game.html. 
 105. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a). 
 106. See Danielle A. Gentin, You Say Zantac, I Say Xanax: A Critique of 
Drug Trademark Approval and Proposals for Reform, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
255, 260 (2000) (citations omitted). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:150. 
 109. Carol Holquist & Jerry Phillips, How FDA Reviews Drug Names, FDA 
Safety Page, Apr. 2, 2001, 
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/drug/MedErrors/reviewDrugNames.pdf. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Public Meeting Transcript, FDA Institute for Safe Medication 
Practices, Evaluating Drug Names for Similarities: Methods and Approaches 
(June 26, 2003), available at 
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the panel compiles a list of proprietary names that are similar 
to the proposed name.112 This list will be one factor in the 
overall consideration of whether a proposed proprietary name is 
found to be likely to confuse.113 
In addition to the expert panel review, the Division of 
Medication Errors also conducts handwriting and verbal 
analyses to determine whether the proposed trademark is 
confusingly similar to another drug name.114 During this phase, 
nurses, pharmacists, and physicians are asked to participate in 
a mock simulation of the prescription ordering process.115  
Because prescription drugs may be accessed by methods other 
than in writing, the Division of Medication Errors also employs 
a similar evaluation for verbal prescription orders.116 
Following the handwriting and verbal analyses, the 
proposed trademark is entered into an FDA computer database 
designed to alert the operator of any potential look-alike sound-
alike confusion associated with use of the trademark.117 Finally, 
the Division of Medication Errors forwards the results to the 
Center’s Office of New Drugs, which makes the final decision as 
to whether the proposed name will be approved or rejected.118  
During this phase, the Office of New Drugs considers the 
results from the expert panel review, the clinical analysis, and 
the computer-assisted analysis to evaluate whether the 
proposed drug name might be confusing in light of the following 
factors: (1) the dosage forms or routes of administration 
(injection, oral, etc.); (2) the marketing status  (whether the 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/meeting/drugnametranscript.doc. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. All participants must be FDA employees; non-FDA employees are 
excluded from participation. Id.; see Part IV(b)  infra. 
 114. Holquist & Phillips, supra note 109. 
 115. See id.  One such test involves presenting the participant with a series 
of handwritten drug names (some of which are on the market and some of 
which are not) shown one at a time. The participant is then asked a series of 
questions relating to the handwritten drug names, including what the name of 
the drug was, whether the participant had seen the name before, and if so, 
what condition it is used to treat.  Id. 
 116. James A. Thomas, The Errors of Error Testing: Potential Liability 
Issues for Medication Error Testing of Pharmaceutical Trademarks Under U.S. 
Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 325, 327 (2004). One method of testing the 
likelihood that the proposed name will confuse when used verbally is the FDA’s 
process of leaving telephone messages with the proposed name and questioning 
the recipient of the message. See Public Meeting Transcript, supra note 111, at 
55, 82. 
 117. See Holquist & Phillips, supra note 109. 
 118. Public Meeting, supra note 111, at 34. 
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drug is available by prescription or over-the-counter at the time 
of application); (3) the indications and directions for use; (4) the 
storage configuration; (5) the clinical setting for dispensation or 
use; (6) the packaging and labeling; and (6) the strength of the 
drug.119 
After the above processes have been completed, the 
Division of Medication Errors then forwards a detailed written 
report to the Office of New Drugs, which makes the final 
determination whether to approve or reject the proposed 
trademark.120 
PART II – THE NECESSARY EVIL OF DUAL AGENCY 
REVIEW 
A. EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY 
Although the FDA and the PTO are concerned with 
eliminating the likelihood of confusion, each agency is 
concerned with a unique type of confusion, and approval or 
rejection of the proposed trademark by one agency is 
independent from the other.121 The FDA’s Division of 
Medication Errors is concerned only with the clinical context in 
which the proposed trademark will operate, namely whether 
approval of the mark will result in confusion during the 
prescription process.122 On the other hand, the PTO is 
concerned mainly with the commercial context, namely whether 
approval of the mark will result in confusion about the source of 
the drug.123 Therefore, a drug manufacturer may obtain FDA 
approval for a proposed drug name, yet may be unable to secure 
registration with the PTO. Similarly, a drug manufacturer may 
fulfill the PTO’s intent-to-use requirements but may be unable 
to acquire FDA approval for the drug name. 
At first blush, calling on two independent agencies to 
regulate something as benign as catchy names and colorful 
packaging appears wasteful and superfluous and poses obvious 
questions: Is it necessary to strain the resources of both the 
FDA and the PTO? If not, is it feasible to lodge this 
 119. Id. 
 120. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:149. 
 121. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19.150. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
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responsibility in one agency to avoid such duplicative efforts? 
Although entirely removing one agency from the process 
has the obvious advantage of efficiency, such a solution is 
impractical for several reasons.  First, no matter how adept at 
determining a likelihood of source confusion, the PTO lacks the 
expertise and scientific resources to conduct a full examination 
of a proposed drug name, particularly the resources necessary 
to determine whether a proposed trademark is intended to 
describe or suggest efficacy.124 Consider again the hair loss drug 
ROGAINE®. Its original proposed name, REGAIN, falls into the 
descriptive125 category of trademarks and cannot be registered 
as a trademark absent a showing of secondary meaning.126 
Confronted with a decision to approve registration of the 
proposed mark, the PTO examiner lacks the expertise and the 
resources necessary to determine whether the drug actually 
does what it promises—that is, whether it actually helps 
consumers “regain” their hair. The necessary scientific and 
experimental resources and expertise to make such 
determinations lie instead with the FDA.127  Of course, the PTO 
lacks the expertise to determine whether other non-
pharmaceutical products do what they promise.  However, the 
fact  that confusion among drug names may be fatal demands 
that the PTO seek the guidance and input of the administration 
designed to protect the public health. 
Second, so long as drugs have generic names, the FDA is 
the only agency suitable to participate in the USAN Council and 
in the process of approving generic drug names. Therefore, 
entirely removing the FDA from the drug name review process 
 124. Gentin, supra note 106, at 262. 
 125. “A descriptive term is one that directly and immediately conveys some 
knowledge of the characteristics of a product or service.” MCCARTHY, supra 
note 12, at § 11:16. 
 126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(1), (f) (2000) (proof of secondary meaning requires 
five years of “substantially exclusive and continuous use”). 
 127. Despite the FDA’s expertise, 
There are a number of instances where the USPTO has found 
pharmaceutical trademarks to be confusingly similar. Examples of 
such include Nicostatin for hyperlipidemia and Mycostatin for an 
antibiotic preparation; Paxetol for cancer treatment and Paxil for an 
antidepressant; Premarin for menopausal conditions and Presamine 
for an antidepressant; and Nalex and Nolex, both used as nasal 
decongestants. 
Haseeb R. Jabbar, Pharmaceutical Trademarks: Likelihood of Confusion vs. 
Likelihood of Harm, PATENT ORLANDO.COM NEWSLETTER, July 2003, 
http://www.patentorlando.com/july03.html. 
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is not a feasible option. With its longstanding expertise in 
medicine and public health, the FDA is the only agency with 
sufficient knowledge to approve names of generic drugs given a 
generic name’s characteristic of conveying descriptive medical 
information.128 In contrast, the PTO does not have the 
knowledge, expertise, or the resources129 to regulate a drug’s 
generic name,130 nor does the Lanham Act provide protection 
for generic names.131 Since there is no need to register generic 
names with the PTO, the agency need not concern itself with 
generic name review.132 
Third, while the FDA is equipped to analyze drug efficacy, 
it plays no role in federal registration of trademarks.133 Instead, 
the PTO, not the FDA, is backed by a statutory mandate and 
has agency proficiency to examine whether consumers are likely 
to confuse the source of a proposed trademark with the source of 
a similar, existing mark.134 Of course, federal registration is not 
required to obtain a trademark.135 Nevertheless, the nationwide 
and global distribution of prescription drugs absolutely requires 
trademark registration and PTO involvement. For these 
reasons, both the PTO and the FDA must be involved in the 
pharmaceutical trademark approval process. 
B. DIRECT- TO- CONSUMER ADVERTISING AND THE GROWING 
IMPORTANCE OF THE PTO 
America has witnessed a staggering  increase in 
pharmaceutical drug expenditures over the last decade. In 2001 
alone, annual U.S. spending on prescription drugs reached 
$2.38 billion— a 200-fold increase over the amount spent in 
1989.136 This increase may be attributable to the United States 
 128. See Gentin, supra note 106, at 262. 
 129. Skolnick, supra note 25, at 101. 
 130. For example a trademark examiner, if charged with reviewing the 
generic name “rofecoxib” can not be expected to understand that the term ‘cox’ 
used in a generic name refers to the family of drugs known as Cox inhibitors, 
let alone have any idea what a cox inhibitor is. This is a task best left to those 
so trained by the FDA. 
 131. Skolnick, supra note 25, at 101 (citing Park N’ Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
and Fly, Inc. 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). 
 132. Skolnick, supra note 25, at 101. 
 133. Gentin, supra note 106, at 258. 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000). 
 135. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 8 (2005). 
 136. Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-to-
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Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.137 and, in large 
part, to the FDA’s 1997 guidelines for using television and radio 
broadcasts in DTC advertising.138  Regardless of its roots, DTC 
advertising has been highly profitable and very efficient. One 
study concluded that of the 30% of respondents who spoke to 
their physician about a specific drug, 44% were given a 
prescription for that drug.139 Another survey conducted by the 
FDA revealed that during doctor visits, 25% of patients 
requested a particular drug from their physician, and of those 
individuals, 69% of them received that prescription.140 
Furthermore, in 2001, every dollar spent on DTC advertising 
resulted in an additional $4.20 in sales.141 DTC advertising is 
Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
423, 424 (2002). 
 137. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy the Court held that a 
Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription 
drugs unconstitutional on First Amendment commercial speech grounds. Id. at 
773. To no avail, the State of Virginia defended the law on several grounds, 
including the argument that permitting such advertisements would 
commercialize the job of the pharmacist and reduce his status as an expert in 
prescribing drugs to that of “a mere retailer.” Id. at 768.  In his dissent, Justice 
Rehnquist feared that opening the door to price advertisements would 
inevitably lead to non-physician commercial advertisement of the drug itself: 
“In the case of ‘our’ hypothetical pharmacist, he may now presumably advertise 
not only the prices of prescription drugs, but may attempt to energetically 
promote their sale so long as he does so truthfully.” Id. at 788.  Justice 
Rehnquist’s prediction has become a reality as pharmaceutical companies now 
directly advertise to the public without physician involvement. 
 138. See Tamar Nordenberg, Direct to You: TV Drug Ads that Make Sense,  
FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 1998, available at  
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1998/198_ads.html. Prior to the 1997 
guidelines, pharmaceutical companies did not utilize television or broadcast 
media due to a 1983 FDA moratorium on such forms of DTC advertising. See 
Patrick A. Moore & Michael A. Newton, Prescription Drug Advertising on the 
Internet: A Proposal for Regulation, 2 W.VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (1998), available at 
http://www.wvu.edu/~law/wvjolt/Arch/Moore/Moore.htm.  For more on the 
history of the FDA’s regulation of DTC advertising, see generally id. 
 139. Wendy Macias & Liza Stavchansky Lewis, A Content Analysis of 
Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) Prescription Drug Websites, J. OF ADVERTISING, 
Winter 2003/2004, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3694/is_200301/ai_n9321002. 
Justice Rehnquist also predicted this effect, explaining that permitting 
pharmacists to advertise the costs of prescription drugs would “generat[e] 
patient pressure upon physicians to prescribe [advertised drugs].” Virginia 
Pharmaceutical, 425 U.S. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 140. Macias & Lewis, supra note 139. 
 141. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER 
ADVERTISING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING  2 (2003) available at 
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expected to become even more pervasive as drug companies 
further their use of the Internet, which has proven to be the 
most cost-efficient and profitable method of DTC advertising.142 
The responsibility and workload of the PTO will continue to 
increase as drug companies continue this onslaught of DTC 
advertising. As new drugs make their way to the market, more 
advertisements will undoubtedly follow.  More advertisements 
for more drugs, by more drug manufacturers, will have the 
logical effect of increasing the amount of confusion among those 
targeted by the advertisements. This increase in DTC 
advertising will require use of the PTO’s expertise143 in 
minimizing source confusion. Although the FDA has the 
expertise and resources to approve or reject a drug name if it is 
likely to be confused in clinical settings or if it otherwise 
violates the agency’s labeling requirements, it does not have the 
expertise or the statutory authority to determine whether it is 
likely to cause consumer confusion about the drug’s commercial 
source.144  Such a task is uniquely within the skill set of the 
PTO.145 
PART III – AGENCY INTEGRATION 
Since both the FDA and the PTO play indispensable and 
increasingly significant roles in the drug name approval 
process, improving the system under which proposed drug 
names are reviewed necessarily requires cooperation between 
both agencies. In its current state, however, the system of dual 
agency review is unduly cumbersome and inefficient and fails to 
provide drug applicants with clear and adequate guidelines for 
evaluating proposed drug names. Further, the differing 
timetables of the two agencies hinder the efforts of potential 
drug applicants to protect their trademark interests. 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Impact-of-Direct-to-Consumer-Advertising-
on-Prescription-Drug-Spending-Summary-of-Findings.pdf 
 142. Christopher Saunders, Web Heating Up for DTC Pharma Promotions, 
CLICK Z NEWS, Sept. 25, 2002,  
http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/1470351.  See also Moore and Newton, 
supra note 138. 
 143. As described in Part I(a)(2), supra, the PTO’s expertise in minimizing 
source confusion is rooted, in part, in its ability and exclusive authority to 
scrutinize trademarks proposed for registration by application of the DuPont 
factors. 
 144. See 21 U.S.C. § 352; 21 C.F.R. § 201.10 (2006). 
 145. See TMEP, supra note 4, at § 1207.01. 
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Currently, obtaining trademark registration through the 
PTO’s intent-to-use provisions takes an average of 19.5 
months.146  The FDA’s proprietary name review typically begins 
at an unspecified point, but can occur as early as the later 
stages of Phase II clinical trials.147 In addition, an average of 
more than five years will lapse between the time the drug 
applicant completes clinical trials and the time the FDA 
ultimately approves the drug for commercial use.148  
Commercial use, of course, is required to satisfy the Lanham 
Act’s intent-to-use provision.149 The problem is that a drug 
manufacturer cannot reserve trademark rights for five years 
under the intent-to-use provisions.150 If the drug manufacturer 
waits too long to file with the PTO, the manufacturer runs the 
risk that a competitor will register the trademark first, thereby 
surrendering commercial priority to the competitor.151 
Conversely, if the drug manufacturer prematurely files an 
intent-to-use application with the PTO, it runs the risk that the 
intent-to-use timeframe will expire before the FDA approves the 
proposed name and before it can be used in commerce to the 
satisfaction of the PTO. Consequently, since the mark is 
published on the principal register after the notice of allowance 
issues,152 another user can “steal” the mark from the principal 
register if the applicant is unable to use it in commerce within 
the thirty month maximum timeframe of the PTO.153 
Drug manufacturers’ efforts to avoid this predicament have 
spawned abuse of the Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions.154 
 146. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:125. 
 147. Merchant, supra note 25, at 8. 
 148. See supra Part I(b)(2) (“Drug Approval Process”). 
 149. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1). 
 150. Id. After filing an intent-to-use application with the PTO, the applicant 
must use the trademark in commerce and file a statement of use within six 
months after the PTO issues a notice of allowance. Id. The applicant may 
obtain extensions to the six-month statement of use requirement in six-month 
increments for a maximum of thirty months. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2) (2000). 
 151. Although the FDA does not publish the proposed names it receives so 
that competitors could “steal” from such a publication, the possibility always 
exists that a competitor will apply for and ultimately secure the same mark 
before the person who initially developed the mark. 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) (2000). 
 153. Such a “user” may be a competitor or may be another company 
involved in a similar, yet distinct industry such as nutritional supplements, for 
example. 
 154. See Melvin A. Silver, Pharmaceutical Trademarks – A Prescription for 
Care, PATTISHALL, MCAULIFFE NEWSLETTER (Pattishall, McAuliffe, Chicago, 
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In the current process of name review, drug manufacturers 
routinely file multiple intent-to-use applications with the PTO 
as a shroud to prevent competitors from determining which 
names are actually submitted to the FDA pursuant to FDA 
requirements.155 Such a practice undermines the Lanham Act’s 
requirement that any mark applied for be the subject of a bona 
fide intent-to-use rather than registered merely to reserve 
rights.156 Not only do such frivolous filings with the PTO lockup 
otherwise usable trademarks, they also undermine the Lanham 
Act’s requirement that intent-to-use applications be filed in 
good faith.157 The conflicting timetables of FDA and PTO 
reviews of proposed drug names encourage applicants to evade 
the PTO’s good faith requirement and, in the end, waste 
valuable PTO resources and undermine the agency’s efficiency. 
First, to reduce such abuse and minimize gamesmanship, 
the PTO should place limits on the number of intent-to-use 
applications a drug manufacturer may submit for any one drug.  
Unlike the FDA, which limits its name review to two proposed 
names, the PTO places no restrictions on the number of intent-
to-use applications that may be filed for a drug.158 Not only will 
limiting the number of intent-to-use applications prevent 
applicants from locking up marks they never intend to use, it 
will also better serve the good faith requirement of the Lanham 
Act’s intent-to-use provision. 
Second, to reduce the temporal hurdles associated with 
complying with the PTO’s intent-to-use provisions, the PTO 
should not accept intent-to-use applications until the FDA 
approves the proposed name at a specific point during Phase 
III, rather than Phase II, clinical trials.159 Requiring the FDA 
Ill.), Winter 2002, at 1, available at  
http://www.pattishall.com/pdfs/winter_2002.pdf. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2000) (explaining that the intent-to-use 
application must include a statement that the mark is “used in commerce”).  
“The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1127 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (2000). 
 158. Merchant, supra note 25, at 8. Arguably, the PTO’s bona fide intent-to-
use requirement is, by itself, a restriction on the number of intent-to-use 
applications that may be filed. Nonetheless, the PTO should develop and 
enforce a specific limit to the number of intent-to-use applications that may be 
filed. 
 159. This change can be implemented most effectively by a specific 
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to complete its review of the drug brand name no earlier than 
1.5 years into Phase III clinical trials will help ensure that the 
PTO’s intent-to-use provisions are not ultimately exhausted.  
Similarly, delaying FDA review will ensure that drug 
manufacturers are able to use the approved name in commerce 
within the timeframe of the current intent-to-use provisions.160 
These proposed solutions, however, are not without 
downsides. Placing a restriction on the number of intent-to-use 
applications that a drug trademark applicant may file singles 
out the pharmaceutical industry while permitting other 
industries to continue the practice of filing multiple 
applications. Nonetheless, the complexity surrounding 
pharmaceutical trademarks calls for a unique set of regulations 
to manage that complexity; put simply, desperate times call for 
desperate measures. Even if the pharmaceutical industry is 
unfairly targeted by such a restriction, the result will only 
ensure compliance with the congressional requirement that 
applicants manifest a bona fide intent-to-use the mark in 
commerce; a requirement that other industries should already 
be following. 
Another concern is whether the Lanham Act forbids the 
FDA from acting as a gatekeeper for the PTO in filtering out the 
pool of proposed trademarks to be reviewed by the PTO. What 
business does the FDA have telling the PTO which drug names 
are and are not deserving of federal registration?  After all, the 
PTO has the sole authority to register trademarks and 
administer proceedings associated therewith.161  Although 
valid, such a concern exalts form over function. Because a 
pharmaceutical drug trademark cannot realistically be used in 
amendment to the Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions directed toward 
pharmaceutical trademarks. The following language could be used in such an 
amendment: “In the case of class 5 goods, the applicant shall not submit its 
application under this section without a verified statement of approval from 
the Food and Drug Administration.” 
 160. Another conceivable solution is to simply extend the PTO’s intent-to-
use provisions for class 5 trademarks (pharmaceuticals). Although such an 
exception would permit applicant’s to reserve rights in the proposed mark, it 
would contribute to the overall inefficiency of the drug name approval process. 
Such a process would continue to encourage drug applicants to file multiple 
intent-to-use applications, thereby drawing on the PTO’s already limited 
resources. The better solution is to require definitive timelines and attempt to 
operate within the already generous intent-to-use timeframe. 
 161. See 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000) (“The Director shall make rules and 
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the 
Patent and Trademark Office under this chapter.”). 
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commerce unless approved by both the FDA and the PTO, it 
makes no difference whether the FDA rejects a drug name 
before the PTO can review it. On the other hand, predicating 
PTO review on FDA approval will increase efficiency because 
the PTO will not be required to review multiple intent-to-use 
applications for names that will later be rejected by the FDA. 
PART IV – SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT FDA 
CONFUSION ANALYSIS & PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A more predictable and efficient system of pharmaceutical 
brand name review may be accomplished by integrating the 
procedures by which the PTO and the FDA analyze likelihood of 
confusion and by substantively improving the manner in which 
the FDA conducts its confusion analysis. The current process by 
which the FDA evaluates look-alike, sound-alike confusion 
among proposed proprietary names is flawed. Studies designed 
to simulate the prescription of a proposed proprietary name lack 
the statistical precision and accuracy necessary to provide 
pharmaceutical companies with a predictable and evenhanded 
appraisal of their proposed names. Furthermore, the FDA 
provides no definite and objective criteria by which proposed 
proprietary names will be evaluated, imposing significant 
financial burdens on pharmaceutical companies. 
A. THE LACK OF SPECIFIC FDA GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA FOR 
REVIEWING PROPOSED DRUG NAMES IMPOSES AN UNDUE 
BURDEN ON DRUG MANUFACTURERS. 
As explained by one pharmaceutical trademark consulting 
firm, “[t]he proprietary name is an unsleeping salesman that 
ceaselessly promotes the product and, therefore, should pack as 
much recognition and recall value as possible.”162  As this quote 
suggests, naming a pharmaceutical drug can be an expensive 
process. In fact, many pharmaceutical companies spend more 
money on drug marketing than on research and development.163  
 162. James L. Dettore & Patricia K. Staub, Legal and Regulatory 
Considerations in the Selection of a Pharmaceutical Proprietary Name, Sept. 
28, 2001, http://www2.brandinst.com/NEWS/FOCUS_12_01.HTM. 
 163. See Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: 
How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the 
Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. LEGIS. 21, 45 (2002) (reporting that “brand 
name [drug] companies” allocate twelve percent of their budgets to research 
and development and thirty percent toward marketing). In 2000, the most 
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For every drug, it is estimated that pharmaceutical companies 
spend anywhere from $250,000 to $2.5 million on developing a 
name that will have a favorable impact on the public.164  The 
naming process is a calculated and deliberate attempt to 
conjure up a favorable image in the minds of consumers.  This 
process usually involves the help of pharmaceutical marketing 
firms.165 
Drug naming is not only expensive; it is also highly 
technical and subliminal. “Relational asemantics”166 or 
“phonologics” for example, are terms drug-branding experts 
have used to describe the unconscious reaction one may have to 
hearing a drug name.167 “Fricative” letters such as X, F, S, and 
Z are frequently used to imply speed.168  Examples include 
XANAX®, ZYRTEC®, and ZOVIRAX®. “Plosive” letters such as 
P, T, and D, are also used frequently in a drug name to convey a 
subliminal indication of power.169  Examples include 
TORADOL®, DOLOBID®, and TESTODERM®. In addition to 
developing names that convey speed or power, pharmaceutical 
companies may also invest in developing suggestive 
trademarks. Examples include the drug CELEBREX®, which is 
intended to convey celebration,170 and CLARITIN®, intended to 
convey clarity.171  Some names are even more imaginative. The 
well known drug VIAGRA®, with its use of the prefix “vi,” is 
said to indicate vitality and “conjur[e] images of power and fury 
of Niagara Falls.”172 
With the FDA’s current role in the drug name approval 
process, pharmaceutical companies are left without any 
profitable pharmaceutical companies spent three times more on drug 
marketing than on research and development.  Id. 
 164. See Julie Kirkwood, What’s in a Name? EAGLE TRIBUNE (North 
Andover, Mass.), Sept. 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.igorinternational.com/press/eagletrib-drug-names.php. See also 
Ipaktchian, supra note 104. 
 165. Some of these firms include Brand Institute Inc. 
(http://www2.brandinst.com) and Med-E.R.R.S., Inc. (http://www.med-
errs.com). 
 166. See Rados, supra note 5. 
 167. Donald G. McNeil Jr., The Science of Naming Drugs (Sorry, the Z is 
Already Taken), NY TIMES, Dec. 27, 2003, § 4, at 10. 
 168. Ipaktchian, supra note 104. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Kirkwood, supra note 164. 
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regulations or indication as to what criteria and standards the 
FDA uses in reviewing a proposed name. Unlike the PTO, which 
follows the Trademark Manual of Examination Procedures 
(TMEP), which provides some objective explanation as to how a 
proposed mark will be reviewed, the FDA has no regulations or 
clear protocols for drug manufacturers to follow. Applicants are 
left only with those provisions detailing the FDA’s 
administrative authority to regulate misleading drug labels173 
and a general knowledge that the drug name will undergo 
surveys that will be limited to FDA employees. How and when 
these surveys will be conducted, the method used to select the 
survey participants, and the time and manner in which these 
events will occur are unknown and are evidently left to the 
discretion of the FDA. 
These procedures need to be codified or adopted in the Code 
of Federal Regulations just as the TMEP describes how a 
trademark will be reviewed. Doing so will provide drug 
applicants with an objective and predictable framework under 
which they can develop their brand names.174 So long as the 
current system persists in its ambiguity and discretion, 
pharmaceutical companies will continue to face the risk of 
wasting millions of dollars on blind development of proposed 
drug names that the FDA may ultimately reject using 
subjective criteria not rooted in any specific rule of law. 
B. CURRENT FDA REVIEW OF LOOK-ALIKE SOUND-ALIKE 
CONFUSION LACKS PRECISION AND ACCURACY 
In a public meeting discussing look-alike sound-alike 
confusion of drug names, Tom Hassall, director and regulatory 
liaison of Merck pharmaceuticals, concluded, “prescription 
analysis studies don’t really test the name for the risk of 
medication error.”175 Partially to blame is the FDA’s failure to 
employ sound statistical principles that account for the lack of 
reliability in the prescription analysis studies. Although the 
FDA cannot be expected to create a statistically flawless 
method of evaluating a concept as subjective as look-alike 
sound-alike confusion, the agency should review proposed drug 
names with elementary statistical principals in mind. 
 173. 21 U.S.C.§ 352(a) (2000). See also, 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.10- 201.323 (2006). 
 174. See Public Meeting Transcript, supra note 111, at 52. 
 175. Id. at 58. 
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A reliable survey must incorporate an adequate pool of 
participants free from selection bias.176  Selection bias, in 
particular, is “a systematic tendency on the part of the sampling 
procedure to exclude one kind of person or another from the 
sample.”177  Bias in the selection procedure can destroy the 
accuracy of the study even when the overall sample size is 
sufficient.178 
In the United States, there are over 500,000 physicians179 
and approximately 230,000 pharmacists.180 Rather than utilize 
this qualified and diverse base of physicians and pharmacists, 
the FDA samples approximately 130 persons, all of whom are 
FDA employees, for its handwriting and verbal analysis testing. 
181 Thus, the vast majority of physicians and pharmacists who 
are not FDA employees are excluded from the sample. Biasing 
the sample in this manner fails to test confusion possibilities in 
the broad array of clinical settings in which physicians and 
pharmacists work. The clinical circumstances surrounding a 
prescription ordered in a busy emergency room, for example, 
may be very different than the circumstances surrounding a 
prescription that is written by a family physician. 
The FDA’s sample may be further biased if the same 
participants are routinely being used to participate in the 
clinical evaluations. If a particular doctor is asked to participate 
in a proprietary name evaluation and has already done so with 
four different prescription drugs, he may have a tendency to 
compare the relative degree of look-alike sound-alike confusion 
that one proposed name has to existing drugs to the degree of 
look-alike sound-alike confusion another drug had with other 
drug names. 
For these reasons, in its surveys, the FDA should utilize a 
randomized sample of physician-prescribers and pharmacists 
employed in a wide variety of settings and should not limit its 
survey participants to FDA employees. 
 176. See DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS 
335 (3d ed. 1998). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2006-07 ed.), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos074.pdf (reporting that physicians and surgeons 
accounted for 567,000 jobs in 2004). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Public Meeting Transcript, supra note 111, at 55. 
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One major hurdle to implementing more reliable surveys is 
the FDA’s confidentiality requirements.182 Currently, the 
character and proposed name of a drug pending FDA approval 
is confidential.183 To the extent these confidentiality 
requirements ultimately protect patent rights and the medical 
records of those participating in clinical trials, such 
confidentiality is necessary. However, there is little use in 
keeping proposed drug names confidential. To eliminate 
selection bias and ultimately increase accuracy, the FDA should 
relax its confidentiality requirements, so that it may utilize 
participants from outside of the FDA to participate in its 
confusion testing. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the complexities surrounding the approval of 
proposed pharmaceutical drug names require the expertise and 
resources of both the FDA and the PTO. Although both agencies 
play a role in the current process of reviewing, approving, and 
regulating pharmaceutical trademarks, the current method is 
legally unsound, inefficient, and fails to provide pharmaceutical 
manufacturers with deliberate and reliable guidelines for 
developing drug names. Until the FDA can provide an 
impartial, statistically accurate method of reviewing the degree 
of confusion that a proposed drug name elicits, and until the 
PTO and the FDA can coordinate their timetables to permit 
pharmaceutical companies to comply in good faith with the 
Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions, millions of dollars spent 
on developing drug names will continue to be in jeopardy. 
 182. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 601.50; 21 C.F.R. § 601.51. 
(2006). 
 183. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(b) (2006) (“FDA will not publicly disclose the 
existence of an application [which includes the proposed drug names] . . . before 
an approvable letter is sent to the applicant.”). 
